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Abstract 
With the increasing dependence on autonomous operating agents 
and robots the need for ethical machine behavior rises. This paper 
presents a moral reasoner that combines connectionism, 
utilitarianism and ethical theory about moral duties. The outcomes 
of the moral reasoning match those of expert ethicists in the health 
domain. This may be useful in many applications, especially where 
machines interact with humans in a medical context. Additionally, 
when connected to a cognitive model of emotional intelligence and 
affective decision making, it can be explored how moral decision 
making impacts affective behavior. 
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Introduction 
In view of increasing intelligence and decreasing costs of 
artificial agents and robots, organizations increasingly use 
such systems for more complex tasks. With this 
development, we increasingly rely on the intelligence of 
agent systems. Because of market pressures to perform 
faster, better, cheaper and more reliably, this reliance on 
machine intelligence will continue to increase (Anderson, 
Anderson & Armen, 2005).  
As the intelligence of machines increases, the amount of 
human supervision decreases and machines increasingly 
operate autonomously. These developments request that we 
should be able to rely on a certain level of ethical behavior 
from machines. As Rosalind Picard (1997) nicely puts it: 
„„the greater the freedom of a machine, the more it will need 
moral standards‟‟. Especially when machines interact with 
humans, which they increasingly do, we need to ensure that 
these machines do not harm us or threaten our autonomy. 
This need for ethical machine behavior has given rise to a 
field that is variously known as Machine Morality, Machine 
Ethics, or Friendly AI (Wallach, Franklin & Allen, 2010).  
There are many domains where machines could play a 
significant role in improving our quality of life as long as 
ethical concerns about their behaviors can be overcome 
(Anderson & Anderson, 2008). This may seem difficult, and 
incorporating ethical behavior into machines is indeed far 
from trivial. Moral decision making is arguably even one of 
the most challenging tasks for computational approaches to 
higher-order cognition (Wallach, Franklin & Allen, 2010). 
 Moreover, with the increasing complexity of autonomous 
agents and robots, it becomes harder to predict their 
behavior, and to conduct it along ethical guidelines. Some 
may argue that this is a good reason not to let machines be 
responsible for making ethical decisions. However, the 
behavior of machines is still far easier to predict than the 
behavior of humans.  Moreover, human behavior is typically 
far from being morally ideal (Allen, Varner & Zinser, 2000). 
One of the reasons for this is that humans are not very good 
at making impartial decisions. We can expect machines to 
outperform us in this capability (Anderson & Anderson, 
2010). Looking at it from this side, it seems that machines 
capable of sufficient moral reasoning would even behave 
ethically better than most human beings would. Perhaps 
interacting with ethical robots may someday even inspire us 
to behave ethically better ourselves. 
There have been various approaches in giving machines 
moral standards, using various methods. One of them, called 
casuistry, looks at previous cases in which there is 
agreement about the correct response. Using the similarities 
with these previous cases and the correct responses to them, 
the machine attempts to determine the correct response to a 
new ethical dilemma.  
Rzepka and Araki (2005) demonstrate an approach, in 
which their system learns to make ethical decisions based on 
web-based knowledge, to be „independent from the 
programmer‟. They argue it may be safer to imitate millions 
of people, instead of a few ethicists and programmers. This 
seems useful for imitating human ethical behavior, but it 
does not seem plausible that machines using this method 
will be able to behave ethically better than humans. After 
all, the system bases its decision on the average behavior of 
humans in general, misbehavior included. 
Guarini (2006) offers another approach that could be 
classified as casuistry. The presented system learns from 
training examples of ethical dilemmas with a known correct 
response using a neural network. After the learning process, 
it is capable of providing plausible responses to new ethical 
dilemmas. However, reclassification of cases remains 
problematic in his approach due to a lack of reflection and 
explicit representation. Therefore, Guarini concludes that 
casuistry alone is not sufficient. 
Anderson and Anderson (2007) agree to this conclusion, 
and address the need for top-down processes. The two most 
dominant top-down mechanisms are (1) utilitarianism and 
(2) ethics about duties. Utilitarians claim that ultimately 
morality is about maximizing the total amount of „utility‟ (a 
measure of happiness or well being) in the world. The 
competing „big picture‟ view of moral principles is that 
ethics is about duties and, on the flip side of duties, the 
rights of individuals (Wallach, Allen & Smit, 2008). 
The two competitors described above may not differ as 
much as it seems. Ethics about duties can be seen as a useful 
model to maximize the total amount of utility. Thinking 
about maximizing the total amount of utility in a too direct 
manner may lead to a sub-optimal amount of utility. For 
example, in the case of the decision to kill one person to 
save five, killing the one person seems to maximize the total 
amount of utility. After all, compared to the decision of 
inaction, it leads to a situation with four more survivors 
(Anderson, Anderson & Armen, 2006). However, for 
humans it may be impossible to favor the decision of killing 
a person in this case over the decision of inaction, without 
also making it more acceptable in other cases to kill human 
beings. Therefore, not having the intuition that it is wrong to 
kill one person to save more people would probably lead to 
a smaller total amount of utility in the world. 
Anderson, Anderson and Armen (2006) use Ross‟s prima 
facie duties (Ross, 1930). Here, prima facie means a moral 
duty may be overruled by a more pressing one. They argue 
that the ideal ethical theory incorporates multiple prima 
facie duties with some sort of a decision procedure to 
determine the ethically correct action in cases where the 
duties give conflicting advice. Their system learns rules 
from examples using a machine learning technique. After 
learning, the system can produce correct responses to 
unlearned cases. 
However, according to Wallach, Franklin and Allen 
(2010), the model of Anderson, Anderson and Armen 
(2006) is rudimentary and cannot accommodate the 
complexity of human decision making. In their work, 
Wallach et al. make a distinction between top-down and 
bottom-up moral-decision faculties and present an approach 
that combines both directions. They argue that the capacity 
for moral judgment in humans is a hybrid of both bottom-up 
mechanisms shaped by evolution and learning, and top-
down mechanisms capable of theory-driven reasoning. 
Morally intelligent robots will eventually need a similar 
fusion, which maintains the dynamic and flexible morality 
of bottom-up systems, which accommodate diverse inputs, 
while subjecting the evaluation of choices and actions to 
top-down principles that represent ideals we strive to meet. 
Wallach, Franklin & Allen (2010) explore the possibility to 
implement moral reasoning in LIDA, a model of human 
cognition. This system combines a bottom-up collection of 
sensory data, such as in the neural network approach of 
Guarini (2006), with top-down processes for making sense 
of its current situation, to predict the results of actions. 
However, the proposed model is not fully implemented yet.  
The current paper can be seen as a first attempt in 
combining a bottom-up and top-down approach. It combines 
a bottom-up structure with top-down knowledge in the form 
of moral duties. It balances between these duties and 
computes a level of morality, which could be seen as an 
estimation of the influence on the total amount of utility in 
the world. 
Wallach, Franklin and Allen (2010) argue that even agents 
who adhere to a deontological ethic or are utilitarians may 
require emotional intelligence as well as other „„supra-
rational‟‟ faculties, such as a sense of self and a theory of 
mind (ToM). Moreover, according to Tronto (1993), care is 
only thought of as good care when it is personalized. 
Therefore, we represented the system in such a way that it is 
easy to connect to Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn, Pontier and 
Siddiqui, 2011), a cognitive model of emotional intelligence 
and affective decision making. Silicon Coppélia contains a 
feedback loop, by which it can learn about the preferences 
of an individual patient, and personalize its behavior. Silicon 
Coppélia estimates an Expected Satisfaction of possible 
actions, based on bottom-up data combined with top-down 
knowledge. This compares to the predicted results of actions 
in Wallach, Franklin and Allen (2010). 
For simulation purposes, we focus on biomedical ethics, 
because in this domain relatively much consensus exists 
about ethically correct behavior. There is an ethically 
defensible goal (health), whereas in other areas (such as 
business and law) the goal may not be ethically defensible 
(money, helping a „bad guy‟) (Anderson & Anderson, 
2007). Moreover, due to a foreseen lack of resources and 
healthcare personnel to provide a high standard of care in 
the near future (WHO, 2010), robots are increasingly being 
used in healthcare.  
Healthcare is a valid case where robots genuinely 
contribute to treatment. For example, previous research 
showed that animal-shaped robots can be useful as a tool for 
occupational therapy. Robins et al. (2005) used mobile 
robots to treat autistic children. Further, Wada and Shibata 
(2007) developed Paro, a robot shaped like a baby-seal that 
interacts with users to encourage positive mental effects. 
Interaction with Paro has been shown to improve users‟ 
moods, making them more active and communicative with 
each other and caregivers. Research groups have used Paro 
for therapy at eldercare facilities and with those having 
Alzheimer‟s disease (Kidd, Taggart & Turkle, 2006; Marti 
et al., 2006). Banks, Willoughby and Banks (2008) showed 
that animal-assisted therapy with an AIBO dog helped just 
as good for reducing loneliness as therapy with a living dog.  
By providing assistance during care tasks, or fulfilling 
them, robots can relieve time for the many duties of care 
workers. However, care robots require rigorous ethical 
reflection to ensure that their design and introduction do not 
impede the promotion of values and the dignity of patients 
at such a vulnerable and sensitive time in their lives (Van 
Wynsberghe, 2012) 
According to Gillon (1994), beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and justice are the four basic prima 
facie moral commitments. Here, confidentiality and 
truthfulness can be seen as a part of autonomy. Because we 
aim to match the expert data given from Buchanan and 
Brock (1989), who focus on dilemmas between autonomy, 
beneficence and non-maleficence, we focus on these three 
moral duties in the remainder of this paper. 
The moral reasoner and its 
relation to Silicon Coppélia 
Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn et al., 2011) is a model of 
emotional intelligence and affective decision making. In this 
model, the agent perceives the user on several dimensions, 
which leads to feelings of involvement and distance. These 
feelings represent the affective component in the decision 
making process. The rational component consists of the 
expected utility of an action for the agent itself (i.e., the 
belief that an action leads to achieving desired goals). 
The system contains a library of goals and each agent has 
a level of ambition for each goal. There are desired and 
undesired goals, all with several levels of importance. The 
levels of ambition the agent attaches to the goals are 
represented by a real value between [-1, 1], where a negative 
value means that the goal is undesired and a positive value 
means that the goal is desired. A higher value means that the 
goal is more important to the agent. 
The system contains a library of actions from which the 
agents can perform. The agent has beliefs about actions 
inhibiting or facilitating goals, represented by a real value 
between [-1, 1], -1 being full inhibition, 1 being full 
facilitation.  
The expected utilities of possible actions are calculated by 
looking at the goal-states it influences. If an action or a 
feature is believed to facilitate a desired goal or inhibits an 
undesired goal, this will increase its expected utility and 
vice versa. The following formula is used to calculate the 
expected utility for the agent itself. 
 
ExpectedUtility(Action, Goal) =   
Belief(facilitates(Action, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal) 
 
Given the level of ambition for a goal and the believed 
facilitation of that goal by an action, the agent calculates the 
expected utility for itself of performing that action regarding 
that goal by multiplying the believed facilitation of the goal 
with the level of ambition for the goal.  
In the current moral reasoner, the agent tries to maximize 
the total amount of utility for everyone. In complex 
situations, it would take too much computational load to 
calculate all possible consequences of an action for 
everyone, and extract this into a single value of „morality‟ of 
the action. Therefore, the agent tries to estimate the morality 
of actions by following three moral duties. These three 
duties consist of seeking to attain three moral values: (1) 
Autonomy, (2) Non-Maleficence and (3) Beneficence. In the 
moral reasoner, the three duties are seen as „moral goals‟ to 
satisfy everyone‟s needs as much as possible. This 
corresponds with Super‟s conceptualization of the 
relationship between needs and values: “values are 
objectives that one seeks to attain to satisfy a need” (Super, 
1973). The moral reasoner aims to pick actions that serve 
these moral goals best.  
What priorities should be given to these three moral 
goals? According to Anderson and Anderson (2008), the 
following consensus exists in medical ethics. A healthcare 
worker should challenge a patient's decision only if the 
patient is not capable of fully autonomous decision making 
(e.g., the patient has irrational fears about an operation) and 
there is either a violation of the duty of non-maleficence 
(e.g., the patient is hurt) or a severe violation of the duty of 
beneficence (e.g., the patient rejects an operation that will 
strongly improve his or her quality of life). In other words, 
Autonomy is the most important duty. Only when a patient 
is not fully autonomous, the other moral goals come into 
play. Further, Non-maleficence is a more important duty 
than Beneficence, because only a severe violation of 
Beneficence requires challenging a patient‟s decision, while 
any violation of Non-maleficence does. Therefore, the 
ambition level for the moral goal „Autonomy‟ was set to the 
highest value and „Non-maleficence‟, which was set to a 
higher value than the ambition level for „Beneficence‟. The 
ambition levels that were given to the moral goals in the 
moral reasoner can be found in Table 1. 
The agent calculates estimated level of Morality of an 
action by taking the sum of the ambition levels of the three 
moral goals multiplied with the beliefs that the particular 
actions facilitate the corresponding moral goals. When
  
Table 1: Ambition levels for moral goals 
 
Moral Goal Ambition level 
Non-Maleficence 0.74 
Beneficence 0.52 
Autonomy 1 
 
moral  goals  are believed to be better facilitated by a moral 
action, the estimated level of Morality will be higher. . The 
following formula is used to calculate the estimated 
Morality of an action: 
 
Morality(Action) =  
Goal( Belief(facilitates(Action, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal)) 
 
Note that this is similar to calculating the Expected Utility 
in Silicon Coppélia. To ensure that the decision of a fully 
autonomous patient is never questioned, we added the 
following rule to the moral reasoner: 
 
IF  belief(facilitates(Action, autonomy) = max_value 
THEN Moralilty(Action) = Morilaity(Action) + 2 
 
As can be seen Figure 1, this can be represented as a 
simple neural network, where moral goals are associated 
with the possible actions via the belief strengths that these 
actions facilitate the three moral goals. A decision function 
F adds the rule and picks the action with the highest 
activation as output. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Moral reasoner shown in graphical format 
Simulation Results 
To see whether the moral reasoner could simulate the moral 
decision making of experts in medical ethics, the analysis of 
ethical dilemmas by expert ethicists was taken from 
Buchanan and Brock (1989). The following simulation 
experiments examine whether the moral reasoner reaches 
the same conclusions as these expert ethicists. 
Experiment 1 
In the simulated situation, the patient refuses to take an 
antibiotic that is almost certain to cure an infection that 
would otherwise likely lead to his death. The decision is the 
result of an irrational fear the patient has of taking 
medications. (For instance, perhaps a relative happened to 
die shortly after taking medication and this patient now 
believes that taking any medication will lead to death.)  
According to Buchanan and Brock (1989), the correct 
answer is that the health care worker should try again to 
change the patient‟s mind because if she accepts his decision 
as final, the harm done to the patient is likely to be severe 
(his death) and his decision can be considered as being less 
than fully autonomous.  
As can be seen in Table 2, the moral reasoner also 
classifies the action „Try again‟ as having a higher level of 
morality than accepting the decision of the patient. In this 
and the following tables, the fields under the three moral 
goals represent the believed facilitation of the corresponding 
moral goal by an action, as taken from Buchanan and Brock 
(1989). „Non-Malef‟ stands for Non-maleficence, and 
„Benef‟ stands for Beneficence.  
 
Table 2: Simulation results of Experiment 1. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 1 1 0,76 
Accept 0.5 -1 -1 -0,8 
Experiment 2 
Once again, the patient refuses to take an antibiotic that is 
almost certain to cure an infection that would otherwise 
likely lead to his death, but this time the decision is made on 
the grounds of long-standing religious beliefs that do not 
allow him to take medications. 
The correct answer in this case, state Buchanan and Brock 
(1989), is that the health care worker should accept the 
patient‟s decision as final because, although the harm that 
will likely result is severe (his death), his decision can be 
seen as being fully autonomous. The health care worker 
must respect a fully autonomous decision made by a 
competent adult patient, even if she disagrees with it, since 
the decision concerns his body and a patient has the right to 
decide what shall be done to his or her body. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the moral reasoner comes to 
the correct conclusion. Here, the rule to ensure the decision 
of a fully autonomous patient is never questioned made a 
difference. If the rule would not have existed, the morality 
of „Accept‟ would have been -0.3, and the moral reasoner 
would have concluded that it was more moral to try again. 
 
Table 3: Simulation results of Experiment 2. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 1 1 0,76 
Accept 1 -1 -1 1,7 
Experiment 3 
Table 4: Simulation results of Experiment 3. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 0.5 0.5 0,13 
Accept 1 -0.5 -0.5 2,37 
 
The patient refuses to take an antibiotic that is likely to 
prevent complications from his illness, complications that 
are not likely to be severe, because of long-standing 
religious beliefs that do not allow him to take medications. 
The correct answer is that the health care worker should 
accept his decision, since once again the decision appears to 
be fully autonomous and there is even less possible harm at 
stake than in Experiment 2. The moral reasoner comes to the 
correct conclusion and estimates the Morality of „Accept‟ 
higher than „Try Again‟, as can be seen in Table 4 
Experiment 4 
A patient will not consider taking medication that could only 
help to alleviate some symptoms of a virus that must run its 
course. He refuses the medication because he has heard 
untrue rumors that the medication is unsafe.  
Even though the decision is less than fully autonomous, 
because it is based on false information, the little good that 
could come from taking the medication does not justify 
trying to change his mind. Thus, the doctor should accept 
his decision. The moral reasoner also comes to this 
conclusion, as can be seen in the last column of Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Simulation results of Experiment 4. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 0 0.5 -0,26 
Accept 0.5 0 -0.5 0,26 
Experiment 5 
A patient with incurable cancer refuses chemotherapy that 
will let him live a few months longer, relatively pain free. 
He refuses the treatment because, ignoring the clear 
evidence to the contrary, he is convinced himself that he is 
cancer-free and does not need chemotherapy. 
According to Buchanan and Brock (1989), the ethically 
preferable answer is to try again. The patient‟s less than 
fully autonomous decision will lead to harm (dying sooner) 
and denies him the chance of a longer life (a violation of the 
duty of beneficence), which he might later regret. The moral 
reasoner comes to the same conclusion, as can be seen in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Simulation results of Experiment 5. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 0.5 0.5 0,13 
Accept 0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0,13 
Experiment 6 
Table 7: Simulation results of Experiment 6. 
 
 Autonomy Non-Malef Benef Morality 
Try Again -0.5 0 1 0,04 
Accept 0.5 0 -1 -0,04 
 
A patient, who has suffered repeated rejection from others 
due to a very large noncancerous abnormal growth on his 
face, refuses to have simple and safe cosmetic surgery to 
remove the growth. Even though this has negatively affected 
his career and social life, he is resigned himself to being an 
outcast, convinced that this is his fate in life. The doctor is 
convinced that his rejection of the surgery stems from 
depression due to his abnormality and that having the 
surgery could vastly improve his entire life and outlook.  
The doctor should try again to convince him because so 
much of an improvement is at stake and his decision is less 
than fully autonomous. Also here, the moral reasoner comes 
to the same conclusion, as can be seen in Table 7. 
Discussion 
The paper described a moral reasoner that combines a 
bottom-up structure with top-down knowledge in the form 
of moral duties. The reasoner estimates the influence of an 
action on the total amount of utility in the world by the 
believed contribution of the action to the following three 
duties: Autonomy, Non-maleficence and Beneficence. 
Following these three duties is represented as having three 
moral goals. The moral reasoner is capable of balancing 
between conflicting moral goals. In simulation experiments, 
the reasoner reached the same conclusions as expert ethicists 
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989).  
Because the representation of goals and beliefs in the 
moral reasoner is very similar to the representation of beliefs 
and goals in the affective decision making process of Silicon 
Coppélia (Hoorn, Pontier & Siddiqui, 2011), the moral 
reasoner could easily be connected to the system. Thereby, 
the moral reasoning could be combined with human-like 
affective decision making, and the behavior of the system 
could be personalized for individuals.  
According to Anderson, Anderson and Armen (2006), 
simply assigning linear weights to the moral duties is not 
sufficiently expressive to capture their relationships. Indeed, 
an extra rule had to be added to satisfy the expert data in 
Experiment 2. However, for all other experiments, this rule 
turned out not to be necessary. 
Also without this rule, it would have been arguable that 
the moral reasoner simulates human-like moral reasoning. 
The analysis of the expert ethicists may not reflect the 
public opinion, however. Perhaps the majority of laymen 
would decide to question the patient‟s refusal to take life-
saving medication. Arguably, it would not be seen as 
inhuman if someone did. 
Even between doctors, there is no consensus about the 
interpretation of values and their ranking and meaning. In 
the work of Van Wynsberghe (2012) this differed depending 
on: the type of care (i.e., social vs. physical care), the task 
(e.g., bathing vs. lifting vs. socializing), the care-giver and 
their style, as well as the care-receiver and their specific 
needs. The same robot used in one hospital can be accepted 
differently depending on the ward. Workers in the post-natal 
ward loved the TUG-robot, while workers in the oncology 
ward found the robot to be rude, socially inappropriate and 
annoying. These workers even kicked the robot when they 
reached maximum frustration (Barras, 2009). 
There may be doctors that feel the urge to pursue a patient 
to take the life-saving medication, but only choose not to do 
so because of ethical guidelines. It could be argued that, 
when health care professionals are making decisions on a 
strict ethical code, they are restricting their regular way of 
decision-making. 
Further, it can be questioned whether a patient can ever be 
fully autonomous.  According to Anderson and Anderson 
(2008), for a decision by a patient concerning his or her care 
to be considered fully autonomous, it must be intentional, 
based on sufficient understanding of his or her medical 
situation and the likely consequences of foregoing 
treatment. Further, the patient must be sufficiently free of 
external constraints (e.g., pressure by others or external 
circumstances, such as a lack of funds) and internal 
constraints (e.g., pain/discomfort, the effects of medication, 
irrational fears or values that are likely to change over time). 
Using this definition, it could be questioned whether the 
patient in Experiment 2 is not under the influence of 
external constraints (i.e., pressure from a religious leader).  
Moreover, it seems that medical ethics are contradicting 
with the law. A fully autonomous decision of a patient 
wanting to commit euthanasia would be represented by the 
same believed contributions to following moral duties as 
those given in experiment 2. In the case of euthanasia, the 
patient also makes a fully autonomous decision that will 
lead to his death. However, in many countries, committing 
active euthanasia is illegal. In countries where euthanasia is 
permitted, it is usually only allowed when the patient is in 
hopeless suffering. By the definition of Anderson and 
Anderson, being in hopeless suffering would mean the 
patient is not free of internal constraints (i.e., pain and 
suffering) and therefore not capable of making fully 
autonomous decisions. On the other hand, in the case of 
hopeless suffering, it could be questioned whether one could 
speak of maleficence when the patient is allowed to commit 
euthanasia. 
However, we would not like to argue against strict ethical 
codes in professional fields such as health care. It is 
important to act based on a consensus to prevent conflicts 
and unnecessary harm. Just as doctors restrict their „natural‟ 
behavior by maintaining a strict ethical code, we can also let 
a robot restrict its behavior by acting through the same strict 
ethical code. 
Moreover, we may well want to aim for machines that 
behave ethically better than human beings. Human behavior 
is typically far from being morally ideal, and a machine 
should probably have higher ethical standards (Allen et al., 
2000). By matching the ethical decision-making of expert 
ethicists, the presented moral reasoner serves as a nice 
starting point in doing so. 
From a cognitive science perspective, an important 
product of work on “machine ethics” is that new insights in 
ethical theory are likely to result (Anderson & Anderson, 
2008). As Daniel Dennett (2006) stated, AI “makes 
philosophy honest”. Ethics must be made computable in 
order to make it clear exactly how agents ought to behave in 
ethical dilemmas. Without a platform for testing the 
adequacy of a particular model of moral decision making, it 
can be quite easy to overlook hidden mechanisms” 
(Wallach, 2010).  
In future research, we intend to integrate the moral 
reasoner with Silicon Coppélia. This could be done in 
various manners. Different applications might benefit from 
different ways of implementation. 
When developing a decision-support system in the 
medical domain such as (Anderson, Anderson & Armen, 
2006), it should have a strict ethical code. When there are 
conflicting moral goals, the outcome of the moral reasoning 
should always give the final answer on how to act. 
Additionally, in consult with medical ethicists and experts 
from the field in which the moral reasoner will be applied, it 
may be necessary to add more rules to the system. 
However, when developing a companion robot or virtual 
character that interacts with the patient, it may be more 
beneficial to give a bit less weight to moral reasoning. Moral 
goals could perhaps be treated the same as other goals that 
motivate the robot‟s behavior. In entertainment settings, we 
often like characters that are naughty (Konijn & Hoorn, 
2005). In entertainment, morally perfect characters may 
even be perceived as boring. In Silicon Coppélia (Hoorn, 
Pontier & Siddiqui, 2011), this could be implemented by 
updating the affective decision making module. Morality 
would be added to the other influences that determine the 
Expected Satisfaction of an action in the decision making 
process. By doing so, human affective decision-making 
behavior could be further explored. 
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